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evidence or discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the same decision wouldhave been made even had there been no discriminatory motive.
 Jones v. Robinson Prop. Group
,427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, if there is only circumstantial evidence tosupport the claim—as is the case in the vast majority of Title VII cases—the case is analyzedaccording to the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in
 McDonnell  Douglas Corp. v. Green
, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
A.Plaintiff’s Claim of Direct Evidence of Discrimination
Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves the fact in question without inferenceor presumption.
Jones
, 427 F.3d at 992. Garza asserts that Kathy Hull’s statement in her EmployeeTermination Report that Garza’s “ghetto-ness” would not be tolerated anymore qualifies as directevidence of Ranier’s discrimination. To be direct evidence, a remark “must be (1) related to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member, (2) proximate in time to theemployment decision, (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision atissue, and (4) related to the employment decision at issue.”
 Reilly v. TXU Corp.
, 271 F. App’x 375,379 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
 Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd.
, 249 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir.2001)).In this case, the parties dispute only the first factor of the four-part test—whether the remark was “related to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member.”
See Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, Inc.
, 478 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 2007). Ranier argues that in order for a protected-class based comment to be probative of an employer’s discriminatory intent, it must bedirect and unambiguous, allowing a reasonable jury to conclude without any inferences or  presumptions that the employee’s protected class was a determinative factor in the decision toterminate the employee. Defendants’ Opposed Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 4. Ranier relieson various cases in support of this statement.
 Moss v. BMC Software, Inc.
, 610 F.3d 917, 929 (5th4
Case 1:12-cv-00475-AWA Document 26 Filed 07/31/13 Page 4 of 11
 
Cir. 2010);
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys.
, 271 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Wyvill v.United Cas. Life Ins. Co.
, 212 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2000)). Ranier asserts that the statementcontained in the Termination Report that “the ‘ghetto-ness’ going on in Garza’s office would not betolerated anymore” and the previous comment that Garza’s “management style was ghetto” referrednot to Garza’s race, but to the rundown appearance of the properties Garza managed. Ranier assertsthat “ghetto” refers to residential areas that are rundown and trash-strewn. Ranier also notes thatcases in which comments containing the word “ghetto” have been viewed as facially discriminatorygenerally involve African American employees, while Garza is Hispanic
. See, e.g., Harrington v.
3
 Disney Reg’l Entm’t, Inc.
, 276 F. App’x 863 (11th Cir. 2007);
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.Ctr.
, 476 F.3d 337 (5th Cir 2007);
Spears v. Patterson UTI Drilling Co.
, 337 F. App’x 416, 2009WL 2134601 (5th Cir. 2009);
Williams v. Taco Bell 
, 46 F. App’x 732, 2002 WL 1973807 (5th Cir.2002);
Green v. Harris Publ’ns, Inc.
, 331 F. Supp. 2d 180, (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Harris v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc.
, 648 F. Supp. 2d 53, (D. D.C. 2009). Thus, Ranier argues, because the statements byHull are not “direct and unambiguous” they are insufficient to support a direct evidence case.Garza, of course, disagrees. Garza asserts that the term “ghetto” was used as a personalreference to her and not to the properties she managed. Garza points out that on the TerminationReport the comment is “the ‘ghetto-ness’ going on in Garza’s office would not be toleratedanymore.” Additionally, Garza maintains, Ranier has failed to establish as a matter of law that Hull’suse of the term “ghetto” was not a racial comment directed at her personally, and thus as a matter of law, summary judgment regarding whether Hull’s statements constitute direct evidence of discrimination is inappropriate.The Court concurs with Garza. When a person with decision making authority, such as Hull,evinces racial animus, that may qualify as direct evidence of discrimination.
See Causey v. Sewell 
Garza identifies herself as Mexican American.
3
5
Case 1:12-cv-00475-AWA Document 26 Filed 07/31/13 Page 5 of 11
 
Cadillac–Chevrolet, Inc.
, 394 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2004);
 see also Young v. City of Houston, Tex.
,906 F.2d 177, 180–81 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing
 Kendall v. Block 
, 821 F.2d 1142, 1145–46 (5th Cir.1987)). It does not appear that the term “ghetto” is viewed as exclusively a slur aimed at AfricanAmericans.
See Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist.
, 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012) (half-Anglo half-Latino student recovered on claims of Title VI racial harassment when other students called him“black,” “nigger,” “gangster,” and followed him around with a noose.) The Fifth Circuit hasrecognized that the term “ghetto” has innate racial overtones.
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.Ctr.
, 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a supervisor’s reference to inner-citychildren as “ghetto children” was “perhaps racially inappropriate.”) A review of various dictionariesshows that the term “ghetto” is in many, if not most, cases associated with racial groups generally,not just African Americans. Miriam Webster defines “ghetto” as:(1) a quarter of a city in which Jews were formerly required to live; (2) a quarter of a city in which members of a minority group live especially because of social, legal,or economic pressure; (3)(a) an isolated group “a geriatric ghetto”; and (3)(b) asituation that resembles a ghetto especially in conferring inferior status or limitingopportunity.
Ghetto.
M
ERRIAM
-W
EBSTER 
.
COM
,
 
http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited July 11, 2013).The Oxford English Dictionary has two definitions of “ghetto”:(1) The quarter in a city, chiefly in Italy, to which the Jews were restricted; (2) Aquarter in a city, esp. a thickly populated slum area, inhabited by a minority group or groups, usu. as a result of economic or social pressures; an area, etc., occupied by anisolated group; an isolated or segregated group, community, or area.
Ghetto, n.
OED
 
O
 NLINE
. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/78056? (last visited July 11, 2013). Noneof these definitions refer specifically to African Americans—only to racial minorities, which as aMexican American, Garza undoubtably qualifies.6
Case 1:12-cv-00475-AWA Document 26 Filed 07/31/13 Page 6 of 11
 
This is not a case where a racial epithet or term was used in the workplace by non-management employees. Hull, who was Garza’s manager, referred to the “ghetto-ness” in Garza’soffice as a reason behind her termination and noted this on her Termination Report. The Fifth Circuithas previously held that any “statement or document which shows on its face that an improper criterion served as a basis—not necessarily the sole basis, but a basis—for the adverse employmentaction” is direct evidence of discrimination.
 Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist.
, 329 F.3d 409, 415(5th Cir. 2003) (citing
 Fierros v. Tex. Dept. of Health
, 274 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thecomment in the Termination Reports is sufficient to serve as direct evidence of discrimination.Further, there are fact questions that remain regarding whether Ranier would have taken the sameaction against Garza had there been no idscrimination.Because this case is before the Court on summary judgment review, the court is required toview the evidence in the light most favorable to Garza, taking the record evidence and all reasonableinferences therefrom in her favor.
 Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist.
, 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.2000). The parties do not dispute that Hull made the statements in issue. It is inappropriate for thecourt to make credibility determinations about Hull’s intentions or weigh the evidence on summary judgment.
 Id.
Upon extensive review of the parties’ arguments and the summary judgment evidencesubmitted in this case, and mindful of the summary judgment standard, the Court finds that Garzahas demonstrated direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to deny Ranier’s Motion for SummaryJudgment.
B.Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination
When race discrimination claims are based on circumstantial evidence, courts apply the
 McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.
 Harrison v. Corr. Corp. of Am.
, 476 F. App’x 40,43 (5th Cir. 2012). As discussed below, even if there were no evidence of direct discrimination in7
Case 1:12-cv-00475-AWA Document 26 Filed 07/31/13 Page 7 of 11
 
this case, and the Court applied the
 McDonnell Douglas
analysis, summary judgment is still notappropriate here.“Under the first step of the
 McDonnell Douglas
framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case.”
 Id.
“After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden ‘shift[s] to theemployer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [action].’ ”
 Id.
(quoting
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). “If the defendant offers such areason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that either (1) the defendant’s alleged justification was pretext for discrimination, or (2) that the defendant's reason, although true, is onlyone of the reasons for its conduct and that another motivating factor was the plaintiff's protectedcharacteristic.”
 Bissett v. Beau Rivage Resorts, Inc.
, 442 F. App'x 148, 151–52 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing
 Alvarado v. Texas Rangers
, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer intentionally discriminated against her because of her protected status.
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp.Sys.
, 271 F.3d 212, 219–20 (5th Cir. 2001).In this case, Ranier assumes,
arguendo
, that Garza can establish a prima facie case of racediscrimination. Garza also in turn assumes,
arguendo
, that Ranier can articulate a legitimate,nondiscriminatory reason for Garza’s termination. In support of meeting its burden of articulatingsome legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Garza’s termination, Ranier asserts that Garza wasterminated for not following company policy, negligence in performing duties, and failing to followinstructions. If the employer sustains its burden, the prima facie case dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish either: (1) that the employer’s proffered reason is not true but isinstead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer’s reason, while true, is not the onlyreason for its conduct, and another “motivating factor” is the plaintiff's protected characteristic.8
Case 1:12-cv-00475-AWA Document 26 Filed 07/31/13 Page 8 of 11
 
 Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.
, 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). In a mixed-motive case, if the plaintiff shows that the illegal discrimination was a motivating factor, the defendant must respondwith evidence that the same employment decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus.
 Id.
 Garza argues that the evidence she offers as direct evidence of Ranier’s discrimination alsosupports her circumstantial evidence mixed-motive case. The Court concurs and finds that Garzahas created fact issues as to whether Ranier discriminated against Garza based upon her race. TheCourt finds that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case under the
 McDonnell Douglas
analysis as well as the direct evidence analysis above.
C.Same Actor Inference
Ranier asserts that it is entitled to the same actor inference because Kathy Hull both hired andterminated Garza. The “same actor inference” rule was first adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
 Brownv. CSC Logic, Inc.,
82 F.3d ___ (5th Cir. 1996). The court explained this rule as follows: “claimsthat employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational. From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (therebyincurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job.” 82 F.3d at 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting
 Proud v. Stone
, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991))(quotation marks and citations omitted). According to
 Proud 
, “The relevance of the fact that theemployee was hired and fired by the same person within a relatively short time span comes in at thethird [or pretext] stage of the [
 McDonnell Douglas
 prima facie case] analysis.” 945 F.2d at 798.When the same supervisory employee hires and fires a plaintiff within a short period of time, “astrong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.”
 Id.
at 797. While evidence that the same actor who hires and fires an employee9
Case 1:12-cv-00475-AWA Document 26 Filed 07/31/13 Page 9 of 11
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